The Changing Labour Force Participation of Canadians, 1969-96: Evidence from a Panel of Six Demographic Groups by Mario Fortin et al.
The Changing Labour Force
Participation of Canadians, 1969-96:
Evidence from a Panel of Six
Demographic Groups
Mario Fortin and Pierre Fortin*
A
fter rising almost without interruption for
four decades, the aggregate labour force
participation rate in Canada fell every year in the
first half of the 1990s, slumping to 64.8 per cent
in 1995-98 from its 1989 peak of 67.5 per cent.
Given the definitional identity linking the em-
ployment-population ratio (E) to the unemploy-
ment rate (U) and the labour force participation
rate (L):
(1) E = (1 - U)*L ,
the sudden large drop in participation combined
with the sustained high level of unemployment
account for the depression in Canadian employ-
ment in this decade. The percentage of working-
age Canadians holding jobs fell from 62.4 per cent
in 1989 to 58.2 per cent in 1993; by 1997 it had
only recovered to 58.9 per cent.
Today, the central macroeconomic question for
Canada is: what proportion of this slump in par-
ticipation and employment is cyclical in the sense
that it can be eliminated without bringing ever-
rising inflation? To answer this question, we need
first an explanation of labour force participation,
and second an explanation of the NAIRU — the
critical level of unemployment (U*) below which
inflation begins to increase without limit. The par-
ticipation rate (L) depends on perceived employ-
ment opportunities as represented by the employ-
ment rate (E), and both it and the NAIRU depend
on structural factors (S), such as demographic
change and social policy. Formally, we have:
(2) L = L(E, S)
(3) U* = U*(S) .
Once these two functions are well-specified,
they can be inserted into equation 1 and com-
bined with population projections to give an esti-
mate of potential, non-cyclical employment and
participation. Potential employment can, in turn,
be combined with trend labour productivity to
yield an estimate of potential output.
In this symposium, the focus is on the aggre-
gate labour force participation shown in equation
2. We set ourselves the task of specifying and esti-
mating this equation directly and deriving some
of its implications. To this end, we use a 28-year
period of macroeconomic observations (1969-96)
for six broad demographic groups: men and
women aged 15-24, 25-54, and 55 and over. In
contrast with the other two econometric papers in
this symposium (Archambault and Grignon,
1999; Beaudry and Lemieux, 1999), our particular
angle is to cover all demographic groups, empha-
size theoretical consistency as well as empirical
flexibility, and pay careful attention to the role of
social policy (unemployment insurance, social as-
sistance and the minimum wage) among struc-
tural factors.
However, because the aggregate data we use
are too coarse and degrees of freedom scarce, we
do not attempt to distinguish precisely between
the specific impacts on labour force participation
of several other structural factors that have been
mentioned in the literature, such as rising school
attendance, the plateauing of women’s participa-
tion, better income protection and rising average
age for older men and women, and worsening
employment prospects among the low-skilled.
While we believe our analysis offers a reasonable
‘explanation’ of past and present, our reliance on
trend variables naturally implies that we cannot
project our results mechanically into the future.
We can ‘explore’ the future, but not predict it.
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nadian labour force participation about equally to
three factors: very poor macroeconomic condi-
tions, major policy changes in unemployment in-
surance and the minimum wage, and broad-
based structural transformations. In the short run,
we find it unlikely that even the best macroe-
conomic prospects can allow the aggregate par-
ticipation rate to recover more than one-third of its
2.7-percentage-point drop between 1989 and
1997. Prospects for a recovery of the employment-
population ratio are better if one believes — as we
do — that equilibrium unemployment has de-
clined since 1989.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 de-
velops our theoretical model of labour force par-
ticipation and presents the data used to test it.
Section 2 explains the empirical methodology and
reports the estimation results. Section 3 tells how
these results explain the recent decline in labour
force participation. Section 4 explores their impli-
cations for the future. Section 5 summarizes the
paper and concludes.
Theory and Measurement
The labour force participation rate of each of
the six demographic groups is the percentage (Li)
of group population i who want to work according
to Labour Force Survey criteria. Following the
standard classical framework, we reason that Li
depends on three sets of factors: individual/fam-
ily preferences and the demographic composition
of the group; economic conditions, including
wealth and non-labour income, wage and em-
ployment opportunities, attractiveness of school-
ing, and so on; and income security programs,
such as unemployment insurance, social assis-
tance and pension benefits.
Our particular implementation of this general
framework will have Li depend on six influences:
(4) Li = Li(J, W/P, Wm/P, rD/M, B/P, T)
where: 
J = index of job availability, 
W/P = average real wage, 
Wm/P = average real minimum wage, 
rD/M = index of unemployment insur-
ance generosity, 
B/P = average real social assistance
benefit and 
T = quadratic annual time trend.
We provide intuition for the impact of each of
these variables on labour force participation.
First, better job opportunities (J) on the de-
mand side raise the subjective probability of suc-
cessful job search and, hence, the expected payoff
to labour force participation. Therefore, Li must
be an increasing function of J. We measure job op-
portunities by the ratio of Statistics Canada’s help-
wanted index to the total working-age popula-
tion. This index is a good instrument because it is
highly correlated with the (demand-side) prob-
ability of finding a job and appears to be insensi-
tive to (supply-side) participation rate shocks (Ar-
chambault and Fortin, 1997).1 Equations 1 and 2
above make clear alternative indexes of labour
market pressure such as the unemployment rate
or the employment-population ratio are unac-
ceptable as such, because they are endogenous to
the employment-participation behavioural sys-
tem.2
Second, the average real wage (W/P) has an
uncertain impact on labour force participation. It
is true that, as a payoff to working, a higher real
wage should draw more people into the labour
force. However, it is also true that a higher real
wage allows workers to achieve a given income
target by participating in the labour force less fre-
quently or for shorter durations. Moreover, in
families where income is shared, the real pay raise
obtained by one member can act as a deterrent to
labour force participation of other members, by
increasing their ‘reservation wage.’ We measure
W/P by dividing the average wage for the entire
economy (W) by the consumer price index (P).3
Third, the average real minimum wage
(Wm/P) also has an uncertain impact on labour
force participation. For a given level of the average
wage in the economy, a higher minimum wage by
itself increases the attractiveness of labour force
participation for minimally qualified workers. But
it may, at the same time, reduce the perceived
probability of successful job search and deter la-
bour force participation by objectively reducing
the availability of jobs (Mincer, 1976). We meas-
ure Wm/P through division of the weighted aver-
age of provincial hourly minimum wages (Wm)
by the consumer price index (P).
Fourth, more generous unemployment insur-
ance (UI) regulations and benefits should encour-
age at least some positive degree of labour force
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participation not only includes the wage when
working, but also the availability and level of UI
compensation when out of work. UI generosity
was substantial in Canada in 1972-89. For exam-
ple, in 1978-89, whenever the regional unemploy-
ment rate exceeded 11.5 per cent, the ‘10/42’ rule
applied. A minimum qualifying period (M) of 10
weeks triggered eligibility of 42 weeks of maxi-
mum benefit duration (D) compensated at the
rate (r) of 60 per cent of the previous weekly
wage. Thus, potential benefits, represented by
rD/M, were 252 per cent of the labour income
earned during the minimum qualifying period.
This implicit wage subsidy amounted to a power-
ful incentive to join and stay in the labour force. A
measure of the severity of federal restrictions im-
posed on UI in 1990, 1993, 1994 and 1996 is that,
at unchanged levels of regional unemployment
rates, the implicit wage subsidy fell to 62 per cent
in 1997 from 180 per cent in 1989.
We use the implicit wage subsidy thus defined
(rD/M) as our measure of UI generosity (Fortin,
1984; Sargent, 1996). We hypothesize that in-
creased generosity in the 1970s raised labour
force participation, and this effect was partly re-
versed by the restrictions of the 1990s. This wide
swing in social policy has been specific to Canada;
it has not occurred in the United States. Naturally,
a test of this hypothesis requires extending our
sample of observations on labour force participa-
tion back to the 1960s. We also allow labour force
participation to respond gradually over several
years to changes in UI generosity.
In calculating the national UI wage subsidy,
rD/M, the wage replacement rate, r, is set at the
common national value. The minimum work re-
quirement, M, and the maximum benefit dura-
tion, D, are calculated national averages not of ac-
tual, but of standardized provincial values. These
standardized values are those M and D would
have taken, given the existing legislation, if pro-
vincial unemployment rates had remained con-
stant (and equal to their sample averages)
throughout the estimation period. This “instru-
mentation” procedure makes the standardized
values of M and D responsive to legislative
changes, but not to cyclical changes in regional
unemployment rates. It cuts off the correlation
that would otherwise arise between random
shocks to labour force participation and the actual
UI wage subsidy measure. If not removed, this
correlation would bias upwards the estimated im-
pact of UI generosity on participation.
Although greater UI generosity tends to induce
more people to enter and stay in the labour force,
it may nevertheless also operate as work disincen-
tive for those already participating. Essentially, by
reducing the marginal cost of not working, more
generous UI discourages participation through
negative income and substitution effects.
To summarize, UI has two conflicting effects on
labour force participation: it brings more people
into the labour force, but it may reduce the extent
of participation of those already working. There-
fore, the net effect of UI generosity on participa-
tion could be positive for some groups and nega-
tive for others.4
Fifth, an increase in the average real social as-
sistance (SA) benefit should weaken labour force
participation by reducing the net payoff to going
from welfare to work. However, the estimated im-
pact could be muted by the fact that provinces re-
quire employable welfare recipients to be avail-
able for work. This could bias their responses to
the LFS in favour of participation. We measure
B/P through division of the average benefit (B) by
the consumer price index (P). The average benefit
is in turn obtained through ex post division of the
sum of all provincial expenditures on general so-
cial assistance by the corresponding total number
of recipients.
Sixth, we use an annual time trend (T = 0, 1,...,
27 in 1969, 1970,..., 1996) to capture all other
smoothly changing variables affecting labour
force participation in the sample period. We make
this trend quadratic (and later test whether it is
cubic) to allow the growth rate of participation it-
self to change over time. It will catch social, eco-
nomic, policy, and other unspecified influences as
well. Among the developments that have been
mentioned in recent literature are the rising rate of
school attendance, the changing roles of men and
women in society, the changing demand and sup-
ply of skills, the development of private and pub-
lic pensions, and the rising average age of the 55-
plus age group.
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and Results
We implement the six equations explaining the
labour force participation rates of the six demo-
graphic groups as follows:
(5) Dlog(Li) = bi0 + bi1 Dlog(J) + bi2 
Dlog(W ¤ P) + bi3 Dlog(Wm ¤ P) + bi4
Dlog(1+r D ¤ M) + bi5 Dlog(B ¤ P) + bi6T + ei.
Here, i indexes demographic groups (i = men
15-24, men 25-54, men 55 and over, women 15-
24, women 25-54, women 55 and over), ei is an
additive zero-mean random error, and the bij’s are
the coefficients to be estimated (j = 0, 1,...,6).
The annual time subscript is omitted everywhere
for simplicity.
The log-linear form of the equations allows the
bij coefficients to be interpreted as elasticities. Our
theoretical expectations are that we must have
bi1 ³ 0 and bi5 £ 0. The annual differencing of the
equations reflects our attempt to eliminate spuri-
ous correlations between jointly trended vari-
ables. It is made necessary by the fact all six par-
ticipation rates display strong upward or
downward trends in our 28-year sample.5 In par-
ticular, since the level equations have been as-
sumed to be quadratic in the annual time trend T,
the above difference equations will be linear in T.
A negative value of bi6 means that the rate of
change in labour force participation Li itself falls
over time. It is well-known, for example, that the
labour force participation rate of middle-aged
women increased more and more slowly from the
1970s to the 1990s — so bi6 should indeed be
negative in this case.
For each difference equation, our sample cov-
ers the same 28 years of macroeconomic observa-
tions, 1969-96. The basic constraint on this time
span comes from social assistance data, which
begin in 1968 and end in 1996. All variables ex-
cept the UI generosity variable are measured in
current-year values. Our UI generosity variable is
a moving average of current- and past three-year
values of the basic index. This distributed-lag
specification is motivated by the existing Cana-
dian and international evidence on delayed la-
bour market reaction to changes in unemploy-
ment insurance legislation (e.g. Fortin, 1994; the
Organization for Economic Co-operation & Devel-
opment, 1994; Lemieux and MacLeod, 1998). It is
empirically supported by minimization of the
Akaike information criterion.
Statistical estimation of the six equations is
based on Zellner’s ‘seemingly-unrelated-regres-
sion’ method. This estimation technique im-
proves upon precision of the traditional ‘ordinary-
least-squares’ method by taking advantage of the
likely presence of contemporaneous intercorrela-
tion between the unmeasured ei error terms of the
equations.6 More details on variable definitions
are provided in the data appendix.
Table 1 reports estimation results for equation
5 that exclude the economy-wide average real
wage variable W/P. This exclusion is motivated
by prior estimation and tests showing this vari-
able plays a statistically negligible role in every
equation.7 Every other variable has a significant
impact on participation for at least two demo-
graphic groups.
With R2 statistics ranging between 0.66 and
0.85, the overall explanatory performance of the
estimated equations is good for the younger and
middle-aged groups, particularly given that esti-
mation is in annual difference form. However, it is
not so good in the case of older groups, where the
R2 statistics fall below 0.30 and much unex-
plained variation remains. Nevertheless, all equa-
tions do well when subjected to a battery of diag-
nostic tests for serial correlation (Durbin-Watson,
Breusch-Pagan), omitted variables (RESET) and
structural change (Chow, CUSUM). We are, in
particular, unable to detect any significant shift in
the regression constant and the time trend coeffi-
cient of any equation over the 1990-96 subpe-
riod.8
One important implication of statistical stabil-
ity is that the declining aggregate participation
rate of the 1990s should not be attributed to some
new structural relationship, but to continuation of
the same modes of labour market behaviour (in-
cluding continuation of the same unspecified
trends) as were observed over the previous 25
years. This raises our confidence that the recent
participation decline can be understood in terms
of the particular outcomes for the explanatory
variables in this decade.
Before working through how the equations ex-
plain developments in the 1990s, we focus on key
aspects of the estimated structure.
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middle-aged groups respond positively and sig-
nificantly to cyclical variations in job opportuni-
ties (J). But there are large differences in ampli-
tude. The estimated cyclical elasticity of
participation ranges from 0.060 for young men to
0.010 for middle-aged women. Basically, younger
groups (15-24) respond four times more than
middle-aged groups (25-54) of the same gender,
and men respond 50 per cent more than women of
the same age group. By contrast, the older groups
(55 and over) do not appear to change their par-
ticipation behaviour in response to cyclical
changes in job availability.
Second, changes in the minimum wage influ-
ence labour force participation among the
younger groups and women, but not among mid-
dle-aged and older men. This pattern is consistent
with the fact almost 90 per cent of minimum-
wage workers are young or female. The estimated
participation elasticities are negative among the
younger groups (-0.16) and middle-aged women
(-0.08, half as large); it is positive and quite large
among older women (0.20).
Table 1 Annual equations for log changes in labour force participation rates,
estimated with panel data for six demographic groups, Canada, 1969-1996
Demographic Groups
15-24 25-54 55 and over
Explanatory Factors M e nW o m e nM e nW o m e nM e nW o m e n
CONSTANT 0.89* 2.52* 0.06 5.31* -0.47 1.99*
(0.44) (0.53) (0.12) (0.34) (0.73) (1.10)
INDEX OF JOB AVAILABILITY 0.060* 0.038* 0.014* 0.010* -0.000 0.017
(0.008) (0.010) (0.002) (0.006) (0.014) (0.020)
AVERAGE REAL MINIMUM WAGE -0.167* -0.164* -0.010 -0.075* -0.009 0.197*
(0.040) (0.048) (0.011) (0.031) (0.066) (0.099)
AVERAGE UI WAGE SUBSIDY 0.086* 0.086* -0.002 0.013 -0.004 -0.120*
(0.022) (0.027) (0.006) (0.017) (0.037) (0.056)
AVERAGE REAL SA BENEFIT -0.015 -0.072 -0.013 -0.111* -0.117* -0.144
(0.040) (0.048) (0.011) (0.031) (0.066) (0.099)
TIME TREND -0.053* -0.120* -0.012* -0.190* -0.081* -0.140*
(0.026) (0.031) (0.007) (0.020) (0.043) (0.065)
Summary statistics
Standard error of regression 0.85 1.03 0.23 0.66 1.41 2.13
R2 s t a t i s t i c 0 . 8 40 . 7 80 . 6 60 . 8 50 . 1 60 . 2 6
D u r b i n - W a t s o n  s t a t i s t i c 1 . 9 82 . 2 62 . 6 22 . 0 62 . 6 62 . 9 4
Note: The theoretical background for the equations and variable definitions are presented in the text and the data appendix. As
indicated in text equation 5, all variables except the time trend are expressed in annual log difference form. Regression
constants, time trend coefficients and standard errors of regressions are expressed in log points. The other coefficients are
interpreted as elasticities. The estimation method is Zellner’s iterative seemingly-unrelated-regression method. Numbers
in parentheses below the estimated coefficients are their estimated standard errors. An asterisk indicates that the
zero-coefficient hypothesis is rejected at the 90 per cent confidence level.
Source:  Authors’ calculations; see text for explanations.
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ticipation to UI generosity is concentrated among
the two younger groups, with significant elastici-
ties of 0.09 for young men and women. The two
middle-aged groups and older men do not seem to
be affected much by changes in UI regulations.
For their part, older women seem to react nega-
tively to UI generosity, with a large and significant
elasticity of -0.12.
Fourth, increases in social assistance benefits
are found to affect negatively participation both
for middle-aged women (among whom the phe-
nomenon of single parenthood is concentrated),
and older men. The two estimated elasticities are
equal to about -0.1. No significant reaction is de-
tected among the younger groups, middle-aged
men and older women. It is important to point out
that traditionally most provinces have imposed
strict controls on the eligibility of young adults for
social assistance and kept young welfare recipi-
ents under closer supervision than older ones.
Since the extent of controls and supervision is
likely to increase with the level of benefits, it is not
surprising the labour force participation rates of
younger groups turns out to be unresponsive to
changing benefit levels.
Fifth, all time trend coefficients have significant
negative estimated values. The slowdown has
been most pronounced among women of all age
groups, who started the period with rapidly in-
creasing participation rates. Based on the esti-
mated coefficients for the constant and the time
trend, we estimate the trend participation rate be-
gan to decline in the mid-1980s for older women,
in the late 1980s for younger women, and in the
late 1990s for middle-aged women.9 The rate also
declined throughout the sample period for mid-
dle-aged and older men, but much more rapidly
among the latter than the former. The participa-
tion of younger men followed the same pattern as
that of younger women, rising up to the late 1980s
and declining afterwards.
The slowing growth rate of trend labour force
participation has been a broad-based phenome-
non, but the reasons no doubt differ between
demographic groups. As explained earlier, our
statistical analysis does not attempt to identify the
various determinants of those trends across
demographic groups, but on the basis of the exist-
ing literature the following presumptions look
reasonable. First, rising school attendance has de-
pressed participation rates among younger men
and women (Archambault and Grignon, 1999).
Second, the diffusion of labour force participation
as a sociological phenomenon has been ap-
proaching maturity among women of all ages
(Beaudry and Lemieux, 1999). Third, better in-
come protection and rising average age have
played a role among older men and women
(Baker and Benjamin, 1997). Fourth, declining
employment opportunities and worsening work-
ing conditions have led to labour force withdraw-
als among the low-skilled population in general
(Murphy and Topel, 1997).
How do our estimated equations explain the
decline in aggregate labour force participation in
the 1990s? To answer this question, we use the es-
timated coefficients reported in Table 1 and simu-
late the impact of the accumulated change in each
explanatory factor on the participation rate of
each demographic group in 1990-97. This makes
1989 the base year of the simulation.
We calculate two types of aggregate statistics.
First, we sum up the simulated impacts of all ex-
planatory factors on the participation rate of each
individual group. The actual change in the group-
specific labour force participation rate over the
period is by definition the sum of this simulated
change and the residual prediction error. Second,
we calculate the population-weighted average of
the simulated group-specific impacts of each fac-
tor to obtain its effect on the participation rate of
the entire population. The actual change in the ag-
gregate participation rate over the period (2.7 per-
centage points) is by definition the sum of these
population-weighted averages of factor-specific
impacts, prediction errors and the effect of shift-
ing population weights.
Formally, as a weighted average of group par-
ticipation rates, the aggregate participation rate
can be written as:
(6) L = S AiLi ,
where Ai is the population weight of group i. From
this definition, the change in L from 1989 to 1997
can be expressed in exact form as:
(7) D L = S A
_ _
i D Li +S L
_ _





i are defined as simple averages
of the 1989 and 1997 values of Ai and Li, respec-
tively.
The first term on the right-hand side of equa-
tion 7 is the population-weighted average of the
group-specific changes in participation rates,
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sidual prediction errors. The second term is what
we have just termed the effect of shifting popula-
tion weights. (Dugan and Robidoux (1999) call it
the demographic composition effect). We calcu-
late this effect generated a small reduction of 0.1
of a percentage point in L in 1990-97.10
Table 2 reports the factor- and group-specific
simulated impacts on participation rates accumu-
lated over the period. Needless to say, the num-
bers should be taken as orders of magnitude, not
as precise figures. In particular, simulations for
older men and women retain the same degree of
imprecision as the Table 1 regressions on which
they are based.
In interpreting these results, it is important to
keep in mind the size and timing of the simulated
factor changes. The index of job availability
dropped from 100 in 1989 to 40 in 1992, then re-
mained almost unchanged in 1992-97. The aver-
age real minimum wage was roughly constant in
1989-91, then increased by 13 per cent in 1991-97.
The standardized implicit UI subsidy decreased
sharply and continuously from 180 per cent of the
wage in 1989 to 62 per cent in 1997. The index of
average real SA benefit first increased from 100 in
1989 to 107 in 1992, then fell to 96 in 1996.11 Two
facts stand out: the cyclical drop was concen-
trated in the first half of the period, policy changes
in the second half; and the saw-tooth movement
in SA benefits did not result in much net change
over the period. The only policy developments
that really mattered were the large accumulated
changes in UI and the increase in the real mini-
mum wage.
The aggregate factor and group statistics in Ta-
ble 2 give two unambiguous messages. First,
across factors the three types of changes contrib-
Table 2 Simulated impacts of cyclical, policy and other structural changes on the




15-24 25-54 55 and over Totala 
Types of Changes Men Women Men Women Men Women 
JOB AVAILABILITY -3.4 -2.0 -1.0 -0.6 0.0 -0.2 -1.0
MINIMUM WAGE -1.5 -1.4 -0.1 -0.7 0.0 0.4 -0.4
UI GENEROSITY -3.1 -2.8 0.1 -0.5 0.1 1.0 -0.5
SOCIAL ASSISTANCE 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1
OTHER STRUCTURALb - 2 . 4- 2 . 2- 1 . 7 4 . 0- 6 . 8- 1 . 9- 0 . 8
TOTAL SIMULATEDc -10.4 -8.2 -2.7 2.5 -6.5 -0.6 -2.6
SIMULATION ERROR 0.4 -0.6 0.0 -0.6 1.5 0.0 -0.0
TOTAL ACTUALd -10.0 -8.8 -2.7 1.9 -5.0 -0.6 -2.7e
Notes
a  Weighted average of the six columns, with weights equal to group population shares. From left to right, these shares are
equal to 0.091, 0.088, 0.285, 0.285, 0.115 and 0.136.
b  Simulated impact of time trend. The various unspecified influences subsumed under this catch-all variable include the
rising rate of school attendance, the changing roles of men and women in society, the changing demand and supply of
skills, the development of pension plans, and the rising average age of the 55-plus age group.
c  Sum of five above lines.
d  Sum of two above lines.
e Includes the small aggregate impact (-0.1 point) of population shifts among the six demographic groups.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Table 1 data; see text for explanations.
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labour force participation rate. Of the 2.7-percent-
age-point drop in aggregate participation in 1989-
97, cyclical reduction in job availability contrib-
uted one point, UI restrictions 0.5 of a point, the
higher minimum wage 0.4 of a point, and other
structural changes 0.8 of a point. Second, across
groups the decline in participation was, on the
contrary, uneven. Younger men and women re-
acted most strongly, with their participation rates
falling by 10 and 8.8 points, respecitvely. The rates
for middle-aged and older men decreased by 2.7
and five points. The participation rate fell only a
bit among older women, and it continued to pull
ahead among middle-aged women. However, the
increase in the latter case was much smaller in the
1990s (1.9 points) than in the 1980s (14.1
points).12
At the detailed level, Table 2 shows the younger
groups dominated the decline in participation
arising from both cyclical and policy changes.
Middle-aged men and, to a lesser extent, middle-
aged women also reacted negatively to cyclical
changes. Middle-aged and older women showed
some sensitivity to policy changes, but in oppo-
site directions. For all groups other than younger
men and women, other structural changes were
the dominant force behind changes in participa-
tion. Trend participation increased rapidly (but,
again, at a slowing rate) among middle-aged
women, and decreased sharply among older men.
Among all other groups, trend participation fell
moderately.
Exploring the Future
How informative are our estimated equations
on the future outlook of labour force participa-
tion? We think they can be useful in projecting cy-
clical and policy-induced developments, but not
very helpful in forecasting other structural
changes.
Policy-induced developments are the easiest to
handle. We believe the major overhaul of recent
years in Canadian social policy has been com-
pleted, and the next decade will see a lot more sta-
bility in this area. We foresee stable real minimum
wages and SA benefits, and no significant addi-
tional amendment to the Employment Insurance
Act. A further reduction of about 0.1 of a percent-
age point in the aggregate participation rate will
occur as a lagged response to past changes in UI
regulations, but no more. This would bring the
participation rate decline on account of accumu-
lated UI restrictions to 0.6 of a percentage point.
Little else is likely to happen in these three areas.
The major policy changes of coming years will in-
stead centre on pension policy, a factor our statis-
tical measurement has included in the ‘other
structural’ category.
Concerning cyclical developments, our esti-
mated equations have established quantitative
links between the job availability index and
group-specific participation rates. But to form an
estimate of how much increase in participation
would accompany a full economic recovery re-
quires knowledge of the equilibrium, non-infla-
tionary value of the job availability index. This
equilibrium value in 1998 and beyond could be
different from the actual 1989 value of the index.
To determine its level amounts to specifying the
level of the NAIRU, beyond the scope of this pa-
per.
In these circumstances, a practical approach
consists of estimating how much the aggregate
participation rate and the aggregate employment-
population ratio would have to increase from their
1997 levels to achieve a range of realistic levels of
the NAIRU. Formally, we simulate equations 1
and 2 in log difference form as follows:
(8) Dlog(E) = Dlog(1 - U) + Dlog(L) ,
(9) Dlog(L) = b1Dlog(E) + etc.,
where b1 is a weighted average of the six esti-
mated bi1 coefficients with weights equal to the
1997 labour force shares.13 These bi1 coefficients
are obtained from re-estimation of equations 5
with the aggregate employment-population ratio
(E) replacing the job availability index (J) as the
cyclical variable in every group equation.14 The
‘etc.’ in equation 9 stands for the sum of all policy
and other structural influences.
We consider equations 8 and 9 as a two-equa-
tion system that can be solved out for Dlog(E) and
Dlog(L) as functions of Dlog(1 - U) and structural
variables. We obtain:
(10) Dlog(E) = [1/(1 - b1)]Dlog(1 - U) + etc.
(11) Dlog(L) = [b1/(1 - b1)]Dlog(1 - U) + etc.
Our estimate for b1 is 0.25. Given the 1997
value of the unemployment rate was 9.2 per cent,
equations 10 and 11 can be used to calculate how
much higher the employment-population ratio
  May 1999  Canadian Business Economics   19 and the participation rate would have been in that
year if the unemployment rate had been at its
NAIRU level and structural variables had been the
same.
Table 3 presents the results of these simulations
for four alternative NAIRU values (6 per cent, 7
per cent, 8 per cent and 9 per cent), which cover a
wide range of opinion on its true value. The 9 per
cent upper limit is a figure preferred by those who
think that the Canadian output gap has already
been closed and the Canadian economy was al-
ready overheating in 1998, a fact that could be
temporarily hidden by the current world com-
modity price deflation.
The 6 per cent lower limit can be rationalized as
follows. Starting from the 8 per cent estimate pro-
duced by the Bank of Canada Research Depart-
ment in the late 1980s (Rose, 1988), three struc-
tural developments since then can be thought of
having reduced equilibrium unemployment.
First, the share of the high-unemployment 15-24
age group in the labour force has fallen from 21
per cent to 16 per cent. Given the five-point differ-
ence between the youth and adult unemployment
rates observed in the high-employment years
1988-89, a mechanical reduction of 0.25 of a per-
centage point in aggregate unemployment must
have followed.
Second, we have just estimated that the string
of federal restrictions to UI eligibility and benefits
will probably have reduced aggregate labour force
participation by 0.6 of a percentage point by the
end of the 1990s. If most of this drop has essen-
tially shifted some non-employment from the un-
employment category to the out-of-labour-force
category, as suggested by the analysis of Card and
Riddell (1996), then, based on equation 8, the
consequence has been a further reduction of 0.8
of a percentage point in structural unemploy-
ment.
Third, the recent performance of the U.S. econ-
omy at full employment may indicate that in-
creased domestic and international competitive
pressure in labour and product markets arising
from deregulation, globalization and freer trade
has cut structural unemployment by up to one
percentage point in North America. Official esti-
mates of the U.S. NAIRU currently put it in the 5
per cent-5.5 per cent range, which is one percent-
age point lower than the 6 per cent-6.5  per cent
range estimated only 10 years ago (Stiglitz, 1997;
United States President, 1998).15
Whatever the exact level of the Canadian
NAIRU, the key result in Table 3 is that, in any fu-
ture non-inflationary cyclical recovery, the aggre-
gate participation rate is currently unlikely to rise
more than 0.8 of a percentage point. The current
equilibrium value of the participation rate would
not seem to exceed 65.6 per cent. Similarly, the
employment-population ratio is unlikely to rise
more than 2.8 percentage points in any non-infla-
tionary cyclical recovery. Its current equilibrium
value would not seem to exceed 61.7 per cent.
Table 3 Simulated reactions of the aggregate labour force participation rate and 
the aggregate employment-population ratio to bringing down the national
unemployment rate to various hypothesized NAIRU levels Canada, 1997 basis
(percentage points)
Unemployment Participation Rate Employment-Population Ratio
From 9.2 per cent to Increase From 64.8 per cent to  Increase From 58.9 per cent to
9  per cent 0.0 64.8 0.2 59.1
8  per cent 0.3 65.1 1.0 59.9
7  per cent 0.5 65.3 1.9 60.9
6  per cent 0.8 65.6 2.8 61.7
Note: The NAIRU is the non-accelerating-inflation rate of unemployment. It is the lowest level of unemployment for which
inflation does not tend to rise without limit. The 9.2 per cent, 64.8 per cent and 58.9 per cent figures for the
unemployment rate, the participation rate and the employment-population ratio are their 1997 actual values. Their
respective 1989 actual values were 7.5 per cent, 67.5 per cent and 62.4 per cent.
Source: Authors’ calculations; see text for explanations.
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numbers, this constitutes useful information in
estimating potential employment and the em-
ployment gap in Canada. If the current level of the
NAIRU is 8 per cent, say, the equilibrium employ-
ment-population ratio according to Table 3 is 59.9
per cent. This is just 0.4 of a percentage point
higher than the actual mid-1998 employment-
population ratio. Given our 24 million working-
age population, the implied current employment
gap would be only 96,000 jobs. If instead the cur-
rent NAIRU is 6 per cent, the equilibrium employ-
ment-population ratio is 61.7 per cent. The result-
ing 2.2-percentage point differential with the
actual mid-1998 employment-population ratio
translates into a much larger employment gap of
528,000 jobs.
Finally, our statistical results are ill-suited for
appraising future structural developments in la-
bour force participation. There are three main rea-
sons for this. First, our modelling of past non-pol-
icy structural change by equation 5 is based on
mechanical annual time trends that are mute on
the nature and relative contribution of underlying
structural factors. Statistical tests reported above
have confirmed the reliability of these trends for
1990-96, but projecting them blindly into the fu-
ture would be foolhardy.
Second, assuming continuation of the past esti-
mated trends reported in Table 1 leads to the ab-
surd prediction that group-specific and aggregate
labour force participation rates in Canada are go-
ing to fall at an accelerating rate in coming years.
In particular, the participation rate of middle-aged
women would be projected to drop from its cur-
rent 77 per cent to the Stone Age level of 45 per
cent before 2020. This does not make much sense.
Third, available data indicate that, contrary to
the pattern of accelerating decline reflected in our
estimated equations, all group-specific participa-
tion rates except for young men have stopped de-
clining or begun to rise again since 1995. In this
respect, the papers by Ip, King and Verdier (1999)
and by Dugan and Robidoux (1999) in this sym-
posium represent useful attempts to escape from
pure projections of past trends. Their analysis
based on systematic comparisons between Can-
ada and the United States takes off where our
econometric study ends.
Conclusion
The 2.7-point drop in its aggregate labour force
participation rate that Canada suffered from 1989
to 1997 is both a puzzle and a cause for concern.
The puzzle is that this occurrence was totally un-
expected and unprecedented in the past half-cen-
tury, and has remained mysterious to this day.
The concern is that, if the drop in participation is
not reversed or at least offset by some concomi-
tant decline in the equilibrium unemployment
rate, Canada will suffer from a permanent reduc-
tion of its national standard of living. There will
be permanently less employment, production and
real income per capita.
So, should the drop in Canadian labour force
participation be a cause for concern? Yes and no.
First, poor macroeconomic conditions in the
1990s have been unambiguously bad for partici-
pation and income, but this can be reversed if and
when the Canadian economy recovers to full em-
ployment. Also worrisome is the high labour force
dropout rate among the low-skilled, which can
only be reduced by education, training or other
long-term structural intervention. In addition, the
welfare implications of other participation-reduc-
ing factors, such as minimum wage increases, re-
stricted access to unemployment insurance bene-
fits and more generous public pensions, are
controversial. To decide whether those develop-
ments are good or bad requires a value judgment
about the relative merits of their implications for
efficiency and equity. To the extent that they result
from free choice, the rising school enrolment rate
and the stabilization of women’s participation
rate should be viewed as welfare-enhancing. In
particular, it is worth pointing out that students
who participate less in the labour force today are
likely to participate more, and more productively,
later.
We do not anticipate that aggregate labour
force participation in Canada will return to its late-
1980s level in the foreseeable future. Minimum
wage, unemployment insurance, and social assis-
tance policies seem to have reached a stable pla-
teau, and any changes in pension policy will have
effects only over the long run.
The current non-inflationary recovery from the
slump of the last decade will lead to some in-
crease in participation and employment. But even
moderately optimistic estimates of the non-infla-
tionary level of the unemployment rate (the
  May 1999  Canadian Business Economics   21 NAIRU), such as 6 per cent, would raise the aggre-
gate participation rate only one third of the way
back to where it was 10 years ago. If a non-infla-
tionary decline of unemployment to 6 per cent in-
deed occurs, it would in fact offset much of the
impact of the drop in participation on employ-
ment. We estimate that, within the current (1997)
structural setting, a 6 per cent NAIRU would im-
ply a 65.6  per cent aggregate participation rate, a
61.7  per cent employment-population ratio, and a
remaining short-term employment gap of more
than 500,000 jobs.
The type of statistical analysis in this paper is
not well-suited for appraising future non-policy
structural developments in labour force participa-
tion. Our study should be seen as complementary
to other papers in this symposium that examine
this problem with alternative methodologies.
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 Notes
* We thank Marcel Bédard, Allan Crawford, David
Green, Manfred Keil, Benoit Robidoux and three
anonymous referees for advice and comments. We are
grateful to the Canadian Institute for Advanced Re-
search for financial support.
1. We are aware that Statistics Canada’s survey method-
ology, the composition of job offers, and the extent of
labour market mismatches may have changed the
meaning of the help-wanted index over the 28-year
period studied. The statistical implication of this
measurement error is that, in the regressions in first-
differences reported below, the impact of the true
change in job availability on the change in labour force
participation will be somewhat underestimated. How-
ever, given the high simple correlation (90 per cent)
between changes in the help-wanted index and
changes in the employment-population ratio, we trust
that the measurement signal-to-noise ratio is large and
the estimation bias is therefore small.
2. One acceptable alternative is to rely on the change in
the help-wanted index as instrument to exogenize the
change in the employment-population ratio and use
the projection to measure DJ and estimate equation 4
(in first-difference form). Introducing the change in
real gross domestic product or the change in any meas-
ure of the output gap as second instrument adds no
further explanatory power. We will employ this projec-
tion of the employment-population ratio in the simu-
lations reported in the section looking to the future.
3. Wage relativities (e.g. women versus men, younger
versus older, low-skilled versus high-skilled) also mat-
ter in principle for the labour force participation deci-
sion, but we do not have good macroeconomic
measures of these variables. We assume that their in-
fluences are captured indirectly through other vari-
ables in our model equation 4.
4. In addition to the UI wage subsidy variable just de-
fined, we experimented with two other UI program
parameters: the national replacement rate (sepa-
rately), and the ratio between maximum insurable and
average earnings. Their estimated effects on partici-
pation were never statistically different from zero. We
did not try to use the disqualification rate for quitters
as a proxy for legal and administrative pressure on UI
claimants, because this is a strongly endogenous vari-
able for which there is currently no obvious instru-
ment. We thank one of our referees for insisting that
we test alternative UI variables.
5. This is shown by formal tests of unit roots based on
the ‘augmented Dickey-Fuller’ statistical procedure.
6. In our particular application, where the regressors are
the same in all equations, Zellner’s method gives the
same estimated coefficients as the ordinary-least-
squares method, but smaller standard errors around
these coefficients.
7. In view of the simultaneous feedback between labour
force participation and wages, the equations including
Dlog(W/P) were estimated with the three-stage-least-
squares method. Identifying instruments were past
real wage growth, past CPI inflation, and a dummy
variable meant to capture the productivity slowdown
of the past 20 years. The joint hypothesis that the bi2
coefficients for Dlog(W/P) estimated by this method
are zero for all six groups cannot be rejected at stand-
ard levels of confidence. The probability value of the
calculated chi-square statistic is 0.40.
8. We checked this in two ways. First, we added two
variables to the list of regressors of the six equations:
a dummy variable equal to 0 before 1990 and to 1 in
1990-96, and a new trend variable equal to 0 before
1990 and to 1, 2,...,7 in 1990-96. Each of the 12 esti-
mated coefficients turns out to be statistically negli-
gible. Second, we added a quadratic time trend term
in each of the six difference equations, which amounts
to introducing a cubic term in the level-form equations
4. Again, each of the six estimated coefficients turned
out to be statistically negligible.
9. With given job availability and social policy, female
participation rates stop rising when their associated
Dlog(Li) declines to zero. This occurs in year t0 = 1969
- bi0/bi6. For example, since Table 1 estimates for mid-
dle-aged women are bi0 = 5.31 percentage points and
bi6 = -0.190 percentage point per year, their partici-
pation rate is estimated to become flat in year t0 =
1997.
10. The contradiction with Dugan and Robidoux (1999),
who find a much larger demographic composition ef-
  22  Canadian Business Economics   May 1999 fect, is only apparent. It occurs for two reasons. First,
they use 1989 labour force weights instead of our av-
erage of 1989 and 1997 weights. Second, they break
down the labour force into 16 demographic groups,
whereas we use only six. As a result, part of their
estimated demographic composition effect is captured
by our estimated within-group trend effects.
11. Our simulations assume this SA benefit index re-
mained unchanged in 1997 from 1996.
12. Beaudry and Lemieux (1999) present a finer analysis
of the diffusion of labour force participation across
successive cohorts of women in 1976-94.
13. In the absence of population shifts, equation 7 simply
reads DL =S AiDLi, where the Ai’s are the population
shares. It follows that Dlog(L)» DL/L =S (AiLi/L)
(DLi/Li) » S FiDlog(Li), since for each group i the ex-
pression AiLi/L simplifies to its labour force share Fi.
Hence the result b1 » S Fibi1, that the cyclical elasticity
of the aggregate participation rate (b1) is approxi-
mately equal to the labour-force-weighted average of the
cyclical elasticities of the group participation rates (bi1).
14. With this replacement, we have estimated the six
group equations by three-stage least squares to get
around the simultaneous feedback between participa-
tion and employment. The identifying instruments
used are last year’s log change in E and the current
growth rate in real GDP. This procedure gives statistical
results almost identical to those reported in Table 1.
15. Achieving a 6 per cent unemployment rate in Canada
may further require that the inflation rate be allowed
to stabilize close to 3 per cent instead of around 1 per
cent. Wage resistance and liquidity trap constraints on
achieving the NAIRU have been emphasized recently by
researchers such as Summers (1991), Tobin (1995), Aker-
lof, Dickens and Perry (1996), and Krugman (1998).
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Data Appendix
Labour force participation rates (Li): Proportion of
group population i (i = men 15 to 24, women
15 to 24, men 25 to 54, women 25 to 54, men
55 and over, women 55 and over) who have a
job or who are actively looking for one. Data
come from Statistics Canada’s monthly La-
bour Force Survey and are extracted from the
CANSIM database. For 1977-97, the log
change in Li is calculated from the most re-
cent revised series for 1976-97; for 1969 -76,
the previous series for 1968-76 is used.
Index of job availability (J): Ratio of help-wanted
index to total population aged 15 and over.
The help-wanted index comes from Statistics
Canada’s monthly measurement of newspa-
per job offers. We have put together a con-
tinuous series for 1968-97 by linking succes-
sive published revisions of the index. The
population aged 15 and over comes from the
monthly Labour Force Survey. All data are ex-
tracted from the CANSIM database.
Average real wage (W/P): Ratio of the average
wage (W) to the consumer price index (P).
For 1983-97, the average wage is the new se-
ries for the fixed-weight index of average
hourly earnings of all employees; for 1968-
82, it is the old series for the average weekly
earnings of all industries. The two series
overlap in the first three months of 1983 and
are linked on that basis before the log change
is calculated. Data come from Statistic Can-
ada’s monthly establishment Survey of Em-
ployment, Earnings & Hours. The consumer
price index comes from Statistic Canada’s
monthly Consumer Price Survey. All series
are extracted from the CANSIM database.
Average real minimum wage (Wm/P): Ratio of the
average minimum wage (Wm) to the con-
sumer price index (P). The average minimum
wage is a fixed-weight average of individual
provincial minimum wages, with weights
equal to the 1991 provincial labour force
shares. Data come from the Department of
Human Resources Development.
Average UI wage subsidy (rD/M): Standardized
product of the wage replacement rate (r) by
the maximum duration of UI benefits avail-
able to the minimally qualified worker (D
weeks), divided by the length of the mini-
mum qualifying period (M weeks). The re-
placement rate is set at the statutory national
value. In relevant years, it is a fixed-weight
average of the general rate and the rate for
claimants with family responsibilities. The
replacement rate is also adjusted to reflect the
non-taxability of UI benefits before the June
1971 UI Act. For the period before June 1971,
the D/M ratio is a fixed-weight average of the
nationally set regular and seasonal ratios. For
the period after June 1971, M and D are na-
tional fixed-weight averages of standardized
provincial values. These standardized values
are those M and D would have taken under
existing legislation with provincial unem-
ployment rates fixed at their sample averages.
For 1997, M is calculated under the assump-
tion of a 30-hour standard work week. Data
come from the various UI/EI Acts, and from
Statistic Canada’s quarterly reports on UI
(cat. no. 71-001 and 73-001).
Average real SA benefit (B/P): Ratio of the aver-
age SA benefit (B) to the CPI (P). The aver-
age SA benefit is the ratio of the sum of all
provincial expenditures on general social
assistance to the corresponding total re-
cipient population. For any given year, the
latter is approximated by the average of
current- and next-year March observa-
tions. Data come from the Department of
Human Resources Development.
Time trend (T): Variable equal to 0 in 1969, 1 in
1970, 2 in 1971,..., 27 in 1996, 28 in 1997.
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